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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT
OF ERRORS OF CONNECTICUT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellants Griswold and Buxton appeal from the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut entered on
April 28, 1964, affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court,
Appellate Division which had affirmed the conviction of ap-
pellants by the Circuit Court, Sixth District. Appellants sub-
mit this statement to demonstrate that the Supreme Court of
the United States has jurisdiction of this appeal in that there





The opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
rendered May 12, 1964, is reported in 25 Conn. L.J. #47, p. 5,
200 A.2d 479.
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
is set forth in the Appendix to this Statement.
JURISDICTION
On November 10, 1961, Julius Maretz, Prosecuting Attorney,
Circuit Court of Connecticut, Sixth Circuit, filed Informations
and Warrants against appellants, alleging violation of Sections
53-32 and 54-196 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, Re-
vision of 1958, pursuant to which appellants were taken into
custody and tried for such alleged violations. Appellants de-
murred to the Informations for the reason that the said stat-
utes were in violation of the Constitution of the United States
and the State of Connecticut both on their face and as applied
to them.
The demurrers were overruled and the appellants, after hear-
ing, were found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of one hun-
dred dollars ($100.00) each on January 2, 1962.
After stipulation by the parties for joint appeals, and an
order by the court therefor, on January 10, 1962, assignment
of errors was made by appellants and an appeal taken to the
Appellate Division of the Circuit Court which affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court, Sixth Circuit in an opinion
rendered on January 7, 1963.
The Appellate Division certified two questions and appel-
lants on January 31, 1963, petitioned for certification of addi-
tional questions by the Supreme Court of Errors for review
of the judgi-nents below which was granted by that court on
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February 19, 1963. Thereafter on April 28, 1964, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut affirmed the judgment of the
Circuit Court, Appellate Division. Stay of execution was
ordered on May 20, 1964.
Notice of appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States
was filed with the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut on
July 22, 1964.
This appeal is authorized by and taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
Section 1257(2). The court below held that the Sections 54-
196 and 53-32 of the General Statutes of Connecticut, 1958 Re-
vision were in conflict with the Constitution of the United
States, neither on their face nor as applied to these appellants.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether Section 53-32, General Statutes of Connecticut, Re-
vision of 1958 in connection with Section 54-196 of said stat-
utes deprive these appellants and their patients of their liberty
without due process of law contrary to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, whether they
deprive these appellants of their property and deny to them
their rights to freedom of speech and the communication of
ideas of great social significance as protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and whether Section 53-32 is uncon-
stitutional on its face and as applied to married patients of
these appellants and other married couples because it is an
unreasonable and unjustifiable invasion of their privacy con-
trary to the Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the





Statutes involved in this case are Section 53-32 and 54-196,
General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1958.
Section 53-32, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of
1958:
"Use of drugs or instruments to prevent conception.
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or in-
strument for the purpose of preventing conception shall
be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less
than sixty days nor more than one year or both fined and
imprisoned."
Section 54-196, General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of
1958:
"Accessories. Any person who assists, abets, counsels,
causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense
may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the princi-
pal offender."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Griswold was and is the Executive Director of
the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and of the
Center which it established in New Haven for the purpose of
making available information and materials under medical
supervision to prevent conception for those married women for
whom the doctors in charge prescribed them. Appellant Bux-
ton was the Medical Director of the aforesaid Center and is a
registered licensed physician and a specialist in obstetrics and
gynecology. He was formerly a professor in these specialties
at the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center in New York
and at present is professor and chariman, Department of Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology at Yale University School of Medicine
and the Grace New Haven Community Hospital.
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Appellants were arrested and charged under Sections 54-196
as being accessories to violations of Section 53-32 Revised Stat-
utes of Connecticut. Three patients testified that they went
to the Center to seek medical advice, that they asked for and
received materials in the nature of instruments and drugs to
prevent conception, instructions from these appellants as to
their proper use and that they returned to their homes, followed
the instructions and used the said articles. Appellants were
convicted over their objection that said Section 53-32 was in
violation of the Constitution of the United States on its face,
and in connection with Section 54-196, was in violation of the
Constitution on its face and as applied to these appellants and
their patients on the Constitutional grounds mentioned above.
Since the arrest and conviction of these appellants, the Center
established to dispense advice, information, materials and in-
structions under the supervision of physicians to married
women for the purpose of preventing conception has ceased
to function as such. Thus the women who, perhaps, most need
this type of medical care are deprived of it, as suggested by
Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961). See Rainwater, And the Poor Get Children, 49 ff.
(1960).
THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL
These cases raise fundamental questions of personal libert~y
and property rights which have never been passed upon by this
Court. The statutes challenged regulate the practice of medi-
cine in an arbitrary, unreasonable and unscientific manner
which seriously restricts physicians in the practice of their pro-
fession and jeopardizes the lives and health of their patients.
They also raise questions as to whether either or both appel-
lants can be punished as accessories to the violation of a statute
claimed by them to be unconstitutional as to their patients thus




invading the privacy and liberty of the married women who
went to the clinic to obtain medical aid, assistance and mate-
rials for the purpose of preventing conception and who there-
after followed the advice and used the materials thus obtained.
POINT I
These laws deprive appellants Buxton and Griswold of rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.
1. "The right of the Doctor to advise his patients according
to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment
rights as to need no extended discussion." Mr. Justice Douglas
in Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). This Court in Kingsley
Pictures vs. Regents, 360 U.S. 64 (1959) held unconstitutional
New York's ban on the film of "Lady Chatterly's Lover" and
in respect to the contention of the state that it could constitu-
tionally forbid the advocacy of conduct (in this instance adul-
tery) which it could validly make a crime, the Court declared,
through Mr. Justice Stuart, "Its (First Amendment) guar-
antee is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy
of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no
less than advocacy of socialism or the single-tax. And in
the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent
no less than that which is convincing." (Pages 688-689)
The mere fact that the advice given is unorthodox or con-
troversial or even hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion is no basis for its being forbidden by the state, if it has,
as Mr. Justice Brennan has written, "the slightest redeem-
ing social importance." Roth vs. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957). Certainly, medical advice approved by those in
the scientific world best Qualified to judge cannot be curtailed
by the state in the light of the First Amendment to the Consti-
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tution and its applicability to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
First Amendment rights occupy a preferred position in our
system of constitutional liberties. Whether this is to be in-
terpreted as a presumption of unconstitutionality of legislation
restricting speech or as diluting the burden of overcoming
whatever presumption of constitutionality is applicable, is im-
material. The evidence to dissipate any presumption of consti-
tutionality is overwhelming. To characterize the advice given
by these appellants to the married women and others who vis-
ited the New Haven Clinic as of "the slightest redeeming so-
cial importance" is an understatement so gross as to be utterly
misleading. The advice here prohibited has, in fact, import-
ance of the highest degree to the women of Connecticut, to
the nation and, indeed, to the world. Attention of the Court
will be directed here only to the most important values of the
prohibited advice, all of which appellants are prepared to docu-
ment fully.
(a) Use of effective contraceptive agencies are frequently
necessary to the health of married women and occa-
sionally to life. Under many types of circumstance
pregnancy affects the mother's health adversely and
childbirth threatens death.
(b) Spacing of children is generally recognized as not
only justifiable but highly desirable for socio-eco-
nomic reasons as well as for the health of mother and
child. To require women in underprivileged eco-
nomic and social groups to have children or renounce
sexual relations with their husbands creates and per-
petuates poverty and conditions of disease and de-
linquency.
(c) It is the opinion of qualified observers that lack of




cies and substantially increases the frequency of ille-
gal abortions.
(d) It is the opinion of qualified observers that an in-
crease in the use of effective contraceptive agencies
substantially reduces the frequency of illigitimate
births.
(e) It is the opinion of qualified observers that the birth
of unwanted children leads to their neglect, delin-
quency and to serious emotional disturbances.
(f) The use of effective contraceptive agencies avoids the
risk of failure of less effective methods such as the
rhythm system and avoids the long recognized ill
effects or prolonged or permanent abstinence from
marital relations.
(g) The work of these appellants in advising and giving
instructions for the use of effective contraceptive
agencies, is in line with and, indeed, promotes na-
tional policy as evidenced by the extensive research
programs of the Public Health Service to develop the
most effective contraceptive agencies and the policy
of making available technical assistance, as a part of
our foreign aid program, to the other nations seeking
methods of population control. A federal program to
abolish poverty has begun. But to fight poverty
without birth control is to fight with one hand tied be-
hind the back.
(h) The work of these appellants will contribute to the
reduction of the increased rate of population growth
in the United States. Unless effectively controlled,
within a half century, population in this country will
rise from its present 190,000,000 to 1,000,000,000.
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2. Both Dr. Buxton and Mrs. Griswold have a right to make
a living which may not be unreasonably restricted by the state.
Both are advocating matters long endorsed by the medical
profession. As early as June 1937 the American Medical Asso-
ciation unanimously adopted the report of its committee to
study contraceptive practices, recommending teaching contra-
ception in medical schools, investigation of materials and meth-
ods, and clarification to physicians of their legal rights in this
field. Among the many medical organizations which have
since passed resolutions in favor of birth control by the use
of devices most likely to be effective are: Section of Obstetrics,
Gynecology and Abdominal Surgery of the American Medical
Association; American Gynecological Association; American
Neurological Association; American Medical Women's Nationr.l
Association; National, Committee on Maternal Health; and a
number of state medical societies including those of Alabama,
Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Southern
Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.
Several states are distributing contraceptive instructions and
materials as part of their public health or welfare programs.
It has long since been established by physicians that the
vaginal diaphragm and the condom and other mechanical or
chemical devices as well as recently developed oral contracep-
tives and the intrauterine coil, all made illegal by the Con-
necticut law, are by far the most effective contraceptive agen-
cies. See Guttmacher, Human Fertility, Volume 12, Number
1, March 1947; Tietze, Journal of the American Medical Asso-
ciation, Volume 140, Page 1265 (1949); Holland, British Ob-
stetric and Gynecological Practice, Page 756-757 (1958);
Novak & Novak, Text Book of Gynecology, Page 607 (1956).




most valuable attribute of his property and liberty in his pro-
fession, namely, the right to advise his patients according to
his scientific training, takes his property unreasonably and
without due process of law. See Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923); Burns Baking Company vs. Bryand, 264 U.S.
504, 513 (1924); England vs. Louisiana State Board of Medi-
cal Examiners, 259 F.2d 626, 627 (1958). Of course, the state
may impose reasonable regulations on the practice of medicine,
but a law which permits a doctor to abort his patient to save her
life but prohibits advice for the use of the most effective means
of preventing pregnancy and death has a negligible claim to
reasonableness.
POINT II
Neither appellant Griswold nor Buxton can be guilty as ac-
cessories to crimes which were never committed. In Poe vs.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), Mr. Justice Harlan, concluding
his dissent, said: "I would adjudicate these appeals and hold
this statute (Section 53-32) unconstitutional insofar as it pur-
ports to make criminal the conduct contemplated by these
married women. It follows that if their conduct cannot be a
crime, appellant Buxton cannot be an accomplice thereto."
If it be argued that appellants are invoking the constitutional
rights of others, viz. the three married women who testified
that they sought, obtained and used the contraceptive advice
and materials, it is sufficient to answer that this is one of the
many situations in which such procedure is permissible. Ap-
pellants show that they have suffered direct and immediate
injury. They have been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced
as accessories. As such they were in the very words of Section
54-196, "prosecuted and punished as if [they] were the princi-
pal offenders."
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In Barrows vs. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1935), this Court held
that Respondent could not be held liable in a state court for
failure to honor restrictive covenant in the sale of land. Re-
spondent was permitted to plead the constitutional rights of
non-Caucasians, "unidentified, but identifiable," because he
would himself sustain immediate injury and the constitutional
rights of "non-Caucasians" impaired by a verdict against him.
"Under the peculiar circumstances of this case," said the Court,
"'we believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying stand-
ing to raise another's rights * * * are outweighed by the need
to protect the fundamental rights which would be denied by
permitting the damages action to be maintained." Ibid., 257.
The rights of the married women who are alleged to have com-
mitted the crime to which appellants have been convicted as
accessories are certainly, as will be shown, as "fundamental" as
those involved in the Barrows case and the injury to appel-
lants (criminal conviction) more serious than a money judg-
ment for damages. See also Pierce vs. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee vs.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), Frankfurter concurring and
Jackson concurring.
Any different result in this case would be intolerable. It
would mean that the State of Connecticut could, as indeed it
has, indirectly but indefinitely enforce an unconstitutional law
and deprive married women of necessary medical care by
prosecuting only alleged accessories.
The following points have been summarized in a valuable
article in a recent law review where the author finds that this
Court appears to be influenced on "standing" problems by four
factors: (1) the interest of the party litigant, (2) the nature
of the constitutional right asserted, (3) the relationship be-
tween the party litigant and the third parties whose constitu-




tion of such rights by third parties in an independent action.
Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 71 Yale
L.J. 599,627 (1962).
.The application of this analysis to the present case clearly
points to the right of these appellants to assert the constitu-
tional rights of the women. In the first place, they have stand-
ing in their own right. Sections 53-32 barring "use" in connec-
tion with Sections 54-196, the accessory statute, deprives them
of rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Unlike
the appellant in Tileston vs. Ullman, 129 Conn. 84, 318 U.S. 44
(1943), these appellants are asserting rights personal to them.
Again, the right of the persons not parties is one highest in the
heirarchy of constitutional values - "the right most valued by
civilized man." The relationship between appellants and their
patients is an important professional one.
Finally and, perhaps, most important, as a practical matter,
the rights of third parties will not be protected otherwise than
through a criminal proceeding of this type. Mr. Justice Bren-
nan in United States vs. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960), ex-
plained that "where as a result of the very litigation in ques-
tion, the constitutional rights of one not a party would be im-
paired, and where he has no effective way to preserve them
himself, the Court may consider those rights as before it." So
too, Justice Harlan in N.A.A.C.P. vs. Alabama, 357 U.S. 49
(1958): "To limit the breadth of issues which must be dealt
with in particular litigation, this Court has generally insisted
that parties rely only on constitutional rights which are per-
sonal to themselves. * * * The principle is not disrespected
where constitutional rights of persons who are not immedi-
ately before the Court could not be effectively vindicated ex-
cept through an appropriate representative before the Court."
It would be hard to imagine a situation to which the above
principle is more applicable. It is, as a practical matter im-
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possible for the women who want and need the advice and care
afforded by these appellants at the closed Clinic to get their
constitutional claims directly before this Court for vindication.
The recent decision under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments (Mapp. vs. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)) and under the
Fifth on self-incrimination (Malloy vs. Hogan, 84 Sp. Ct. 1487
(1964) ) together with the husband-wife testimonial privilege,
make successful prosecution for "use" under Section 53-32 of
the Connecticut statutes highly improbable. Thus, these
women cannot obtain the relief and medical care to which they
are entitled unless their right thereto is vindicated in a prose-
cution under Section 53-32 in connection with Section 54-196,
as in the present case.
POINT III
The law forbidding the use of contraceptive devices deprives
married women in Connecticut of their liberty and their priv-
acy, as protected by the Fourth, Fourteenth and Ninth Amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States.
1. If, as was declared in Meyer vs. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
391 (1923), the term "liberty" includes freedom "to marry,
establish a home, and bring up children," it would seem neces-
sarily to include the freedom to limit the number of children
to those a married couple feel that they can bring up in de-
cency and in health. How they arrive at a decision on this
matter and the preventive means which they adopt is a matter
of personal and intimate privacy. This law "reaches into inti-
macies of the marriage relationship," wrote Mr. Justice Douglas
in Poe vs. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). "If we imagine the
regime of full enforcement of the law," he continued, "in the
manner of Anthony Comstock, we would reach the point where
search warrants issued and officers appeared in bedrooms to




And so it is not. But when the state makes 'use' a crime and
applies the criminal sanction to man and wife, the state has
entered the innermost sanctum of the home. If it can make
this law, it can enforce it. * * * This is an invasion of the
privacy that is implicit in a free society." Mr. Justice Harlan
stated the proposition with equal forcefulness in his opinion
in Poe. "This enactment," he wrote, "involves what, by com-
mon understanding throughout the English speaking world,
must be granted to be a most fundamental aspect of 'liberty',
the privacy of the home in its most basic sense * *
2. In 1961 this Court decided that violation of the Fourth
Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures in a case involving the privacy of the home was forbidden
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp vs. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
It is true that the Fourth Amendment thus made applicable
to the states, with rare exceptions, forbids the physical en-
trance into the home by police officers unless a warrant has
been issued by a magistrate on "probable cause". But as Mr.
Justice Harlan pointed out in his opinion in Poe vs. Ullman,
"It would surely be an extreme instance of sacrificing substance
to form were it to be held that the constitutional principle of
privacy against arbitrary official intrusion comprehends only
physical invasions by the police. * * * But to my mind such
a distinction is so insubstantial as to be captious: If the physi-
cal curtilage of the home is protected, it is surely as a result
of solicitude to protect the privacies of the life within. Cer-
tainly the safeguarding of the home does not follow merely
from the sanctity of property rights. The home derives its
pre-eminence as the seat of family life and the integrity of that
life is something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection the principles of more than one explicitly
granted constitutional right."
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3. The Ninth Amendment to the Constitution provides
that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained
by the people." It is submitted that this Amendment, as di-
rectly applicable to the States or as made so by the Fourteenth,
should be interpreted to protect aspects of what has been called
the rights of privacy as a protection additional to that afforded
by other Amendments. The framers of the Bill of Rights took
care to provide protection against the two physical types of in-
vasion of privacy with which they were most familiar, namely,
the notorious Writs of Assistance by which the King's Officers
ransacked at large through private homes in search of contra-
band imports, and the quartering of soldiers in private homes
without the consent of the owner. But with the "progress" of
time, the ingenuity of man has discovered many other and
more subtle ways of harrassing his neighbor. Even before
1884, the government of Connecticut invaded the bedroom of
married couples, making the State, literally, a "naked society."
The founding fathers foresaw that this could happen and took
care to provide against it in the Ninth Amendment. Certainly
rights so closely akin to those which concerned the fathers
should be included in the "rights retained by the people."
Indeed, the so-called "right of privacy" is a broad general
term which in fact includes a number of "rights" or "interests."
Actually one may regard the religious guarantees of the First
Amendment as protecting an aspect of what could be called
"privacy", that is, freedom of conscience and freedom from
compelled religious conformity, such as saluting the flag in
public schools or mumbling a prayer dictated by the schools.
This is an important area which, as Justice Douglas has de-
clared, "the First Amendment fences off from government."
Sherbert vs. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963). There is the




to be let alone." There is the interest in freedom from wire
tapping or other types of eavesdropping. The privilege against
self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment, in connection with
the Fourth, as they run "almost into each other" protects an-
other privacy interest. There is the interest that one has in
his life history or in his likeness. This interest is quite different
from the right to seclusion. It is what, perhaps, Judge Frank
called the "right to publicity" rather than the "right to priv-
acy." Then, too, there is the interest in freedom from disagree-
able noises and odors which has long been recognized in the
law of nuisance. c
Most if not all of these so-called aspects of privacy have
been protected by the common law, some of them for centuries.
The rights which the three women who obtained advice from
Dr. Buxton and his assistant, Mrs. Griswold, as involved in this
case are certainly closely akin to other aspects of privacy spe-
cifically recognized in the Constitution and are, in many re-
spects, far more important; namely, freedom from coerced
marital conformity in the bedroom. There is State action as
much and as effective when it requires private citizens to deny
constitutional rights to other citizens as when it acts directly to
impinge on those rights. The Ninth Amendment to the Consti-
tution certainly was intended to protect some rights of the
people. What more appropriate than the freedom here claimed
for these women? In referring to the opinion of Lord Camden
in what Mr. Justice Bradley called a landmark of English lib-
erty and one on which the Fourth Amendment is based, the
Justice declared that "the principles laid down in this opinion
affect the very essence of the constitutional liberty and security.
They reach farther than the concrete form of the case then
before the Court with its adventitious circumstances; [the case
was an action for trespass against several of the King's mes-
sengers, reported in 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, (1765)]
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they apply to all invasions on the part of the Government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of
life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of
his drawers that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it
is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense,
- it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and
constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's judgment." Boyd vs.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1855).
The "personal liberty' in the sense of the "right to be let
alone" is perhaps the most important of all - "the right most
valued by civilized men." "It is quite true," Dean Griswold
has written, "that this phrase cannot be found in the Constitu-
tion. But it is implicit in many of the provisions of the Con-
stitution and in the philosophic background out of which the
Constitution was formulated., * * * The right to be let alone
is the underlying theme of the Bill of Rights." Griswold, The
Right to be Let Alone, 55 N.W.U.L. Rev. 216-217 (1960). It
is submitted that the invasion of the interest of married spouses
in the sanctity and privacy of their marital relations, involved
in this Connecticut statute, is a violation of precisely the kind
of "right" which the Ninth Amendment was intended to se-
cure.
Professor Redlich, in an important article has pointed out
that in interpreting both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
"the textual standard should be the entire Constitution." "The
original Constitution," he wrote, "and its amendments project
through the ages the image of a free and open society. The
Ninth and Tenth Amendments recognized - at the very out-
set of our national experience - that it was impossible to fill
in every detail of this image. For that reason certain rights




two amendments indicate that the rights reserved were to be of
a nature comparable to the rights enumerated." Redlich, Are
There Certain Rights * * * Retained by the People, 37 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 787, 810 (1962). Certainly the aspects of privacy pro-
tected by the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth (privilege against
self-incrimination) are comparable to the rights of the married
women who sought medical instruction from these appellants.
POINT IV
These laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment rights of all
parties concerned in that the restrictions are unreasonable
because every justification for them under the police power
of the state fails.
1. These laws are not narrowly drawn. They are not re-
stricted to their presumed purpose which is to prevent meri-
tricious relations between unmarried persons. They are also
applicable to married spouses and thus they "burn down the
house to roast the pig." Butler vs. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380
(1956).
2. The laws do not attain the desired results of preventing
licentious relations between unmarried persons since the for-
bidden contraceptive devices may be obtained in practically all
drug stores in the state. (See opinion by Justice Frankfurter in
Poe vs. Ullman, supra.) It is assumed that they are thus avail-
able for the prevention of disease. See Commonwealth vs.
Corbitt, 307 Massachusetts 608, 29 N.E. 2d 150 (1940), cited
with apparent approval in Tileston vs. Ullman, 128 Conn.
84,91 (1942).
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CONCLUSION
The issues in these cases are of great importance to these
appellants and their patients and of far-reaching importance
to the medical profession. It is submitted that the First,
Fourth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitu-
tion forbid the State of Connecticut to enact laws which fly in
the face of both common sense and science and which unrea-
sonably and arbitrarily restrict physicians and clinic workers
from giving and their patients from receiving the best medical
advice and care available.
Respectfully submitted,
FowLm V. HAP,&R,
127 Wall Street,
New Haven, Connecticut.
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